1 of 12 DOCUMENTS
Erma Schrader, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,
Respondent-Appellee
No. 88-1907
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT
916
F.2d 361; 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 18220; 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
P50,545; 66
A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5701
January 30, 1990, Argued
October 18, 1990, Decided
October 18, 1990, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1]
On Appeal
from the United States Tax Court; Tax Ct. No. 4724-88.
DISPOSITION: Dismissed.
COUNSEL: Counsel
for Petitioner-Appellant: Barbara C.
Applegarth, argued, Frost & Jacobs, Cincinnati, Ohio, Erma
Schrader,
Louisville, Kentucky.
Counsel for Respondent-Appellee: William F. Nelson,
Internal
Revenue Service, Washington, District of Columbia, Gary R. Allen,
Acting Chief,
William S. Rose, Robert S. Pomerance, David English Carmack, Joel
A.
Rabinovitz, argued, United States Department of Justice, Appellate
Section Tax
Division, Washington, District of Columbia.
JUDGES: Nathaniel R. Jones and James
L. Ryan, Circuit Judges, [**2] and Douglas W. Hillman,
Chief District Judge.
*
* The Honorable
Douglas W.
Hillman, Chief
Judge of
the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
OPINION
BY:PER CURIAM
OPINION
[*362]
Appellant, Erma Schrader appeals the Tax Court's dismissal of
her petition
for review of a
deficiency in her 1983 federal income tax. Because we find
dismissal of one
year of a multi-year petition is not a final
appealable order, we
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
Appellee, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, determined a deficiency in appellant's federal income tax
for three
years: 1983, 1984 and 1985. On March 8,
1988, the taxpayer filed a pro se petition for redetermination in
the Tax Court
objecting to any income tax deficiencies for all three years. The
Commissioner
moved to dismiss the taxpayer's petition as to tax year
1983 for the reason that it
was
untimely pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6213. On
August
3, 1988, the
Tax Court issued an order
granting the Commissioner's motion and dismissing the 1983 claim,
but still
leaving the claims for 1984 and 1985 to be adjudicated. This appeal
followed.
II.
[**3]
While neither party addressed the issue of this Court's
jurisdiction in
its briefs and argument, we are obliged to raise it sua sponte
whenever reason for inquiry exists. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740, 96 S. Ct.
1202, 47 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1976);Ambrose v. Welch, 729 F.2d 1084
(6th Cir.
1984) (per curiam).
Our jurisdictional authority to
review decisions of
the Tax Court stems from 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a),
which
provides in pertinent part: "The
United States Court of Appeals . . . shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to
review the decisions of the Tax Court
. . . in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions
of
the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury." An
appeal of
this nature, challenging the dismissal of one year in a multi-year
petition, in
the civil context would require certification from the district
court in order to be appealable. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b). However, because no analogue to this certification
procedure applies
to the Tax Court, the appealability
of
this
order
remains an open question.
The definition of "decision" for the purposes of
determining
appealability [**4] under 26 U.S.C. §
7482(a) was specifically addressed by this
Circuit
in Sampson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 710
F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1983). Factors we considered relevant to
the
appealability question there included whether the order would be
reviewable
later, should the immediate appeal be refused, [*363]
and whether
the
ruling disposed
of the entire case. See also, Louisville Builders Supply Co.
v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 294 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1961).
Applying these factors to the instant
case counsels us to conclude that the Tax Court's order is not
appealable at
this juncture. Obviously an order pertaining only to one year
of a multi-year petition does not dispose of the entire case.
Furthermore, the
taxpayer is in no way impeded from challenging the Tax Court's
order regarding
the 1983 deficiency upon resolution of the remaining claims.
We reach the same conclusion under the
analysis applied with respect to district court cases under the
final judgment rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
Determining whether or not an order is a final decision
"requires
that 'the inconvenience
[**5] and costs of piecemeal
review' be weighed against 'the danger of denying justice by
delay.'"United States v. Michigan,
901
F.2d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1990), quoting
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 85 S.
Ct. 308,
311, 13 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1964). The court, as well as the
public,
has a compelling interest in avoiding multiple appeals from a
single
proceeding whenever possible. Justice will not be compromised by
requiring
that appeals from
a multi-year petition be
brought together upon final disposition of
the
claim.
Indeed, in many
instances consideration of all related claims together enhances
the
decision-making process.
Other circuits confronted with this
issue have reached divergent results. While at least two other
circuits have
implicitly held such orders would be appealable, see,
Commission
of Internal Revenue v. Smith Paper, Inc.,
222
F.2d 126, 129 (1st Cir. 1955); Wilson v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 564 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam),
cert. denied, 439 U.S.
832, 99 S. Ct. 110, 58 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1978), only the
Second
Circuit squarely addressed the [**6]
issue.
In Estate of Yaeger v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 801 F.2d 96, 98 (2nd Cir. 1986) the Second
Circuit held that "Tax
Court decisions are appealable only if they dispose of an entire
case."
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
we adopt the Second Circuit's reasoning and hold that until the Tax
Court
dispositively rules upon the taxpayer's claims for 1984 and 1985,
this court
does not have jurisdiction over the appeal.
Therefore, this appeal is DISMISSED
for
lack of appellate jurisdiction.